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22 February 1964

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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Greece: King Paul's illness, which has led to the appointment of Prince Constantine as regent, threatens prospects for cooperation between the palace and new Premier George Papandreou.

There has not been a really close relationship between the palace and Papandreou. After the latter's surprise victory in the November 1963 elections, however, both the King and Papandreou appeared willing to try to improve relations. The embassy comments that a cooperative relationship "based on an understanding of the realities of their respective situations" appeared in prospect.

Should Paul die, this prospect might well pass with him. Constantine and Queen Frederika have both indicated strong distaste for Papandreou. \*The premier, in a recent conversation with Ambassador Labouisse, was hopeful about the future development of Constantine but noted that he was strongly influenced by the Queen.

Papandreou complained that the Queen does not understand nor believe in democracy and accuses those who disagree with her of acting in bad faith. The premier, however, said he had no wish to see the position of the monarchy brought into public debate in Greece--noting that reviving this issue would only play into the hands of the communists.

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DAILY BRIEF

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\*Gabon: The French troops who reinstated President Mba following the 18 February military coup are in control, but there is still a threat of unrest.

The US Embassy reports that while all is quiet in Libreville, there are rumors of unrest in outlying sections. Dissatisfaction in these areas probably stems from a reaction against French intervention and Mba's announced intention to deal harshly with the rebels.

The French have apparently had some success in their efforts to persuade Mba to compromise with his political opponents. Although it now appears that Mba will mete out severe punishment to the young officers who overthrew him, he announced yesterday that the political elements involved would not be prosecuted unless they had personally taken part in the coup.

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DAILY BRIEF

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Laos: New frictions among neutralist leaders may block more effective anti-Communist efforts in the Plaine des Jarres area.]

General Amkha, chief of Souvanna's neutralist military cabinet in Vientiane, on 17 February revealed to the US ambassador a plan to establish a unified headquarters to coordinate rightist, Meo, and neutralist forces in the Plaine.]

Premier Souvanna has expressed support for Amkha's plan, observing that neutralist commander Kong Le was not competent to handle large-scale organizational matters.]

Kong Le recognizes the need for a coordinated operational command, but fears Amkha's plan is part of a move to oust him from leadership of the neutralist forces. He further believes that this plan is French inspired. Kong Le plans to set up a joint logistical base west of the Plaine des Jarres with Meo commander Vang Pao.]]

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Austria: A major political hassle may occur if Chancellor Alfons Gorbach resigns next week as expected.

Gorbach's replacement will probably be Josef Klaus, chairman of the People's Party, the dominant partner in the governing coalition. For the past year, the 53-year-old Klaus has been the standard-bearer of those elements in the party who feel that Gorbach has been lacking firmness in dealing with the Socialist Party, the other component of the 18-year-old coalition.

Foreign Minister Kreisky, a Socialist, told US Ambassador Riddleberger on 18 February that there would be many changes in the cabinet if Gorbach leaves office. Kreisky also feels that such a development would require the renegotiation of the coalition agreement, and that this would be no easy job.

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
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NOTES

Congo: [The anti-Adoula Committee of National Liberation (CNL), based in Brazzaville, has established a branch in Burundi apparently to foment disorders in the eastern Congo, particularly in the Kivu area. CNL pamphlets designed to incite mutiny are circulating in army camps there. The CNL has yet to demonstrate its capabilities. If it could foment a rising in the turbulent Kivu area, this would pose a serious problem for the Congolese Army which is engaged with the rebellion in the Kwilu region of western Congo.]

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\*Turkey: The attempted assassination of Prime Minister Inonu yesterday appears to have little political significance. While the would-be assassin spoke out against the 27 May 1960 revolution which overthrew the Bayar-Menderes regime, it does not appear that his action was part of a broader plot. Inonu is the prime moderating influence in Turkey, and his loss at this time could have endangered internal stability and increased the threat of unilateral intervention in Cyprus.

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The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

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The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

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The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

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Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

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Commander in Chief, Pacific

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The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

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The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

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